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LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
OVERVIEW
The decisions of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals belie the increased
legal activity generated by the energy boom in the western states. The deci-
sions this year include many of the areas addressed in previous years: envi-
ronment, property, public land, and federal regulation. Indian law
continues to be a significant area in the Tenth Circuit.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
In Stauffer Chemical Co. v. Environmental Protection Agenc,' the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals interpreted section 114(a)(2) of the Clean Air Act.
2
This section requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to con-
duct annual oversight inspections of major polluters in every state in order to
evaluate the effectiveness of the individual state's inspection and regulatory
procedures, as well as to assess the individual polluter's compliance with the
Act's provisions. 3 Section 114(a)(2) specifically provides that "the Adminis-
trator or his authorized representative upon presentation of his credentials-
(A) shall have a right of ent0i to, upon, or through any premises .... 4
A controversy arose when Stauffer's Leefe Plant in Wyoming5 was se-
lected as one of the sources to be inspected in 1980.6 When the team of EPA
inspectors arrived unannounced at the plant, two of its members were re-
fused admittance unless they signed a nondisclosure and hold harmless
agreement. This condition was imposed because the two inspectors were em-
ployees of GCA Corporation, a North Carolina corporation under contract
to the EPA who aided in carrying out the oversight inspections. 7 The team
left the plant after refusing to sign the agreements. Negotiations between
Stauffer and EPA on the matter failed, and EPA subsequently applied for
and obtained an administrative search warrant from the United States Mag-
I. 647 F.2d 1075 (10th Cir. 1981).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. 11 1978 & Supp. III 1979). Section 114(a)(2) appears as
42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(2) (Supp. 11 1978 & Supp. III 1979).
3. Wyoming lies within the jurisdiction of Region VIII of the EPA. At the time the suit
was brought there were about 1000 major stationary sources of air pollution in the Region, 230
of them in Wyoming. The Clean Air Act mandates that the inspections cover ten percent of
these sources. 647 F.2d at 1076.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(2) (Supp. 11 1978 & Supp. III 1979) (emphasis added).
5. The facility is a phosphate ore processing plant located in Lincoln County near Sage,
Wyoming. 647 F.2d at 1075-76.
6. The selection of sources to be inspected is based upon a neutral administrative scheme
which focuses on classes of industry, geographic location, and frequency of past inspection. Id.
at 1076.
7. Stauffer claimed it was simply trying to protect its trade secrets from competitors. Id.
It further insisted that Stauffer be permitted to advise the contractors of the areas and processes
it deemed to be confidential and proprietary, and that Stauffer reserved the right to exclude any
areas other than emission sources from the inspection, and to refuse to disclose any information
which Stauffer deemed inappropriate. Id. n.2.
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istrate.8 The search warrant proved to be ineffective in gaining entry,9 and
Stauffer then filed a motion in district court to enjoin the EPA from execut-
ing the search warrant and to quash the warrant. The district court issued
the temporary restraining order and later permanently enjoined EPA from
using GCA or similar employees in any inspection of Stauffer's Wyoming
plant. '0
The narrow issue presented to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was
whether an employee of a private company under contract with EPA was an
"authorized representative" of the Administrator for the purpose of inspec-
tion under section 114(a)(2). Since the term "authorized representative" is
not defined in the Clean Air Act, the court ascertained its meaning by refer-
ring to congressional intent.
Judge McWilliams, writing for the court, rejected a literal interpreta-
tion of the term "authorized representative."'' Although the legislative his-
tory provided no definitive guidance, the court relied on the language of one
proposed Senate amendment to the House version of the Clean Air Act
which specifically limited entry to "DHEW personnel.' 2 A later conference
report on the final compromise version of the Act substantially included the
provisions of this Senate amendment. 13 The court concluded that this provi-
sion of the Senate bill later substantially became section 114(a)(2) of the
Clean Air Act, evidencing that Congress intended the term "DHEW person-
nel" to be synonomous with "authorized representative." Today, the EPA
has replaced the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (DHEW) as
the agency administering the Clean Air Act; therefore "authorized represen-
tative" must now be construed to mean "EPA personnel". Because Congress
granted a particular agency the authority to inspect, delegation of that au-
thority to other agencies is precluded.'
4
Further support for this interpretation was found in the Tenth Circuit's
analogy between section 114(a) (2) and the inspection provisions of the Clean
Water Act.'5 In 1972, the Clean Water Act was amended,' 6 making its in-
spection provisions virtually identical to section 114(a)(2). One Senate re-
port on the amendment had commented, "as under the Clean Air Act, [the
authority to enter] is reserved to the Administrator and his authorized represent-
atives which such representatives must befull-time employees of the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency. The authority is not extended to contractors with the EPA in
1 8. The search warrant authorized "any duly designated enforcement officers and employ-
ees of EPA and authorized employees of EPA's contractor, GCA Corporation, who have been
duly authorized to conduct inspections as EPA representatives" to enter the plant. Id. at 1077.
9. Stauffer again refused admittance unless the contractors signed the nondisclosure and
hold harmless agreement. Id.
10. In re Stauffer Chem. Co., 14 Envir. Rep. 1737 (D. Wyo. 1980).
11. 647 F.2d at 1078.
12. Id. S. 4358, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. § 116 (1970).
13. H.R. REP. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., repninedin [19701 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 5356, 5379-81.
14. 647 F.2d at 1078.
15. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976, Supp. 1 1977 &
Supp. 11 1978).
16. Section 308 was added, 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(B) (1976).
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pursuit of research and development." 1 7 The court stated that it must pro-
hibit employees of EPA contractors from inspecting under the Clean Air Act
in order to maintain consistency of interpretation; an employee of a com-
pany under contract with EPA could not be an "authorized representative"
for purposes of one Act and not the other.' 8
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that some ambiguity existed within
the language of the statute itself and that its decision conflicted with two
district court decisions. 19 However, the court concluded that the legislative
history of the two Acts mandated affirmance of the trial court's decision.
20
II. CONDEMNATION
In United States v. 77,819.10 Acres of Land,2 ' the United States appealed
the amount of a condemnation award made to compensate landowners for
the imposition of an evacuation estate22 on their land. At issue were the
methods used by the court-appointed commission to determine the amounts
awarded.
23
The Tenth Circuit found no error in the award to the private party
plaintiffs, 24 whose award was based on the testimony of an expert witness.
The court concluded that in determining diminution in property value, ex-
pert opinion can be used if the opinion is based upon a rational founda-
tion.25 In the award to the state, however, the court found that the
commission had erroneously relied upon an exhibit, introduced solely for the
purpose of showing the entire project area and the ranch in juxtaposition to
each other, as the basis for its conclusion that the state land's remaining
highest and best use was for granting easements. 26 The court concluded that
17. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,reprtedin [1972], U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS
3668, 3729 (emphasis added). In considering the weight to be given to the Clean Water Act for
interpreting section 114(a)(2), the Tenth Circuit was cognizant of the fact that it was looking to
post-enactment legislative history, generally held to have less weight than contemporaneous
legislative history. United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962). The court, however, found
the short interval between enactments and the similar subject matter of the two Acts to be
offsetting factors. 647 F.2d at 1079.
18. 647 F.2d at 1079.
19. Id. n.9. Bunker Hill Co. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, No. 80-
2087 (D. Idaho, Oct. 15, 1980), appeal docketed, No. 80-3446 (9th Cir. 1980); In Re Aluminum
Co., No. M-80-13 (M.D. N.C. July 9, 1980), appeal docketed, No. 80-1599 (4th Cir. 1980).
20. 647 F.2d at 1079-80.
21. 647 F.2d 104 (10th Cir. 1981).
22. An evacuation estate is an interest in land enabling the condemnor to require occu-
pants to periodically vacate the land. Id. at 106 n. 1. The United States had taken two succes-
sive evacuation estates of over 77,819.10 acres of plaintiffs' ranchland. The duration of the
taking totaled thirteen months. Id. at 106.
23. The commission had awarded the Taylors, who owned approximately 58,131 acres and
leased another 19,949.99 acres from the State of New Mexico, $33,735. The state, which re-
served all other interests in the land leased to the Taylors, was awarded $4,237 as compensation
for the takings. Id.
24. The Taylors' award was based on "a fair rental value per animal approach" for 13,494
animal unit months. Id. at 107.
25. The expert witness was not titled as an expert appraiser, but based his expertise on his
experience as a cattle ranch manager in the area, as well as upon his participation in ranch sales
in the area. He had concluded that the fair rental value of the ranchland would be diminished
by 50% after the taking. This determination was held to be rationally founded. Id. at 108.
26. Id. at 109-10. The fair market value of condemned property is determined by reference
19821
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the commission's reliance on the exhibit for this purpose was clearly
erroneous.
27
The district court also erred in calculating the actual acreage of the
state land which may have been used for easements. After reviewing the
exhibits, the Tenth Circuit could find no competent evidence to support the
commission's determination of acreage.
2 8
The commission's conclusion that a highest and best use as an easement
existed was also not supported by the evidence. The court, applying the
standard of whether there is a "reasonable probability that the land is physi-
cally adaptable for such use and whether there is a need or demand for such
use in the reasonably near future,"'29 again found no basis to support the
state's award. The state presented no evidence establishing past requests to
use the land as an easement, nor any potential for such use.30 Therefore, the
award rendered on behalf of the state was reversed.
3 t
In another condemnation case, United States v. 179.26 Acres of Land,32 the
Tenth Circuit addressed the narrow issue of whether the presence of lime-
stone in condemned property is to be considered in determining fair market
value of the land. The court determined that the commission had correctly
included the value of limestone in assessing the fair market value of the
property.
At the time of the taking, the land was being used for livestock and
grain production, and as a rock quarry.33 The land contained some 2.4 mil-
lion tons of Plattsmouth limestone reserves. The commission found the land
was being put to its highest and best use, and included the expected income
from the rock quarry in valuing the condemned property. 34 The landowners
were awarded $243,930 as compensation for the taking.
35
The Government contended that the limestone deposits should not have
been considered in determining the fair market value, and that if the depos-
its were properly included in the valuation, the commission's method of val-
uation was erroneous. 36 In reviewing the district court's determinations in
to the highest and best use for which the land is available. United States v. 91.90 Acres of Land,
586 F.2d 79 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979). Though the highest and best use is
usually the best use to which the property is subjected, the courts have recognized that certain
circumstances may require a finding that another highest and best use exists. United States v.
Buhler, 305 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1962).
27. 647 F.2d at 109-10.
28. Id. at 110. The parties had stipulated that 16,945.99 acres of state land had been
taken, but the Tenth Circuit concluded that only about 1,600 acres could have been considered
as having clear potential for highest and best use as easements.
29. The landowner has the burden of establishing the amount of compensation due. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 644 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1981).
33. The condemned lands constituted 179.26 acres of a 282.39 acre tract. The lands were
condemned for the construction and operation of a lake as part of a comprehensive plan of flood
control in the Missouri River Basin. Id. at 368.
34. The value of the property included a capitalized net annual return from the quarry.
Id. See note 36 infra.
35. Id. at 368.
36. The commission had determined that the land would have produced 100,000 tons of
limestone per annum for 20 years (the life of the quarry); the net annual return would have
[Vol. 59:2
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the condemnation proceedings, the Tenth Circuit refused to scrutinize the
commission's findings except to determine whether they were clearly errone-
ous.3 7 Using a substantial evidence test, the court concluded that it had not
been clearly erroneous for the commission to consider the presence of lime-
stone under the land when awarding condemnation damages.
38
The commission had used an income capitalization method to deter-
mine the fair market value of the property. The Government contended
that this method was highly speculative and unreliable, and it should not
have been used. The Government argued that prevailing royalty rates for
limestone leasing in the area, 39 which were significantly lower than the net
annual return rate, should be used as establishing the market value of lime-
stone.4° Capitalizing the royalty rate would substantially reduce the
amount of the award. The court determined that since there had been no
comparable land sales which the commission could use as evidence of market
value other factors must be considered. 4 ' On a number of occasions the
Tenth Circuit had already articulated what those factors might be.4 2 In
these holdings, the Tenth Circuit had concluded that no particular formula
for determining the fair market value exists. 43 That being the case, some
element of speculation and uncertainty might be allowed to creep into ex-
pert testimony, particularly relative to "in place" mineral reserves. 44 The
income capitalization method had been approved by the Tenth Circuit as
well as several other circuits in condemnation proceedings. 45 It was the
court's view that the competency of the expert witnesses had been properly
established. The record reflected sufficient evidence to allow the commission
been 26 cents per ton ($26,000 each year); a proper capitalization rate was 18% per annum; the
income and capitalization computation basis was the proper method to employ since there were
no comparable sales for the limestone reserves; applying the Inwood Table, the proper factor to
be used to determine the present contributory value of limestone reserves in place was 5.352747;
and the present contributory value of the limestone reserves in place was $139,170. 644 F.2d at
368.
37. Id. at 369.
38. Id. at 373-74.
39. At trial, it was established that the royalty rates had varied from three cents to eight
cents per ton and that the current royalty rates in the area were between eight and ten cents per
ton. Id.
40. The Government also presented evidence that the quarry could not sell 100,000 tons
per year and that a more accurate capitalization rate in a mining operation was 25%. However,
all the valuation evidence was controverted. Id. at 369-71.
41. Id. at 371-72.
42. United States v. 25.02 Acres of Land, 495 F.2d 1398 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Corbin, 423 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Sowards, 370 F.2d 87 (10th Cir. 1966).
43. The best evidence of market value is the purchase price of comparable land within a
reasonable time before the taking. If this is unavailable, other major factors to be considered
include: 1) a view of the premises and the surroundings; 2) the physical characteristics of the
property and its relation to points of importance in the neighborhood; 3) the purchase price of
the land; 4) the price of neighboring land at the time of the taking; 5) expert opinion; 6) the uses
for which the land is available; 7) the cost of improvements; and 8) the net income derived from
the land. 644 F.2d at 371-72 (citing United States v. 25.02 Acres of Land, 478 F.2d 484 (10th Cir.
1973)).
44. 644 F.2d at 372-73.
45. United States v. Corbin, 423 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Whitehurst,
377 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1964); United States v. 158.76 Acres of Land, 298 F.2d 559 (2d Cir.
1962); United States v. 1629.6 Acres, 360 F. Supp. 147 (D. Del. 1973), afdinpart and rev'd in part
on other grounds, 503 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1974).
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to make an informed estimate of value. Its findings, adopted by the district
court, were not clearly erroneous and the landowner had sustained his bur-
den of establishing the right to substantial compensation. 46
III. PUBLIC UTILITIES RATEMAKING
In Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States 4 7 the Tenth Circuit consid-
ered three petitions seeking review of rates set by the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) which Union Pacific Railroad and Utah Railway Com-
pany could charge the Nevada Power Company for transporting coal from
Utah to Nevada.48 The ICC had allowed the railroads to charge Nevada
Power a rate of $9.21 per ton while it investigated the "fall back" rate sched-
ule that the railroads proposed. The ICC then cancelled the $9.21 per ton
rate and declared that a rate of $7.91 was justified. The railroads were or-
dered to refund to Nevada Power the unjustified portion of the increase with
interest.
49
The first issue on appeal was whether the ICC had acted properly under
49 U.S.C. § 10306(a). 50 This section requires a majority of the ICC to be
present in order to transact business. The ICC consists of eleven members; 5 1
however, at the time the ICC's decision was filed, only six persons were serv-
ing on the ICC due to vacancies. Furthermore, only four members partici-
pated in the decision. The railroads argued that because a quorum of six
was necessary to transact business, the ICC's order was a nullity since it had
acted in an improper fashion. 52 The Tenth Circuit disagreed, finding that
section 10301(e)53 provides that vacancies in the ICC's membership do not
impair the rights of the remaining members to act. 54 Because a majority of
the six existing members participated in the decision, the order was proce-
durally valid.
The railroads further contended that the decision was not supported by
a majority of the four members who did participate. One member dissented,
and the three who voted in favor of the decision did not agree in their "nota-
tion votes" on the exact rate to be allowed. However, the Tenth Circuit held
that the fact that no objections were filed to the revised proposal which was
circulated on an "absent objection" basis constituted action by the
majority.55
In addressing the merits of the controversy, the court concluded that the
ICC had acted without justification in limiting Union Pacific's rate to a
46. 644 F.2d at 373.
47. 637 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1981).
48. Nevada Power had a coal-burning station at Moapa, Nevada and purchased coal at
two mines in Utah. Utah Railway transported the coal from the mines to Provo, Utah and
Union Pacific completed the transportation to the power station. Id. at 765.
49. Id. at 766.
50. 49 U.S.C. § 10306(a) (Supp. III 1979).
51. Id. § 10306(b).
52. 637 F.2d at 766.
53. 49 U.S.C. § 10306(e) (Supp. III 1979).
54. The court noted that it was in accord with the Seventh Circuit on this issue, 637 F.2d
at 766. See Assure Competitive Transp., Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1980).
55. 637 F.2d at 767.
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fixed standard seven percent additive5 6 over fully allocated costs without
giving Union Pacific the opportunity to present evidence of the need for a
greater additive. The court stated that while deference will be given an
agency decision generally, the decision must be rationally based.57 The rec-
ord reflected no facts supporting the decision; instead, the ICC's cost deter-
minations appeared to have simply imposed the fixed seven percent additive.
The decision was set aside and the case remanded for further proceedings. 58
IV. THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
In Public Service Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,59 the Tenth
Circuit consolidated three cases involving orders issued by the Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission.
The first petition appealed an order by the Commission requiring the
Public Service Company of New Mexico (PNM) to file its contract for
purchase of coal from Western Coal Company with the Commission. The
Commission based its order on 18 C.F.R. § 35.14(a)(7) 60 which requires
filing if the purchase is made from a controlled source and is not subject to
regulatory authority. PNM protested the order because the Commission
would treat any subsequent changes in the contract as rate schedule
changes.6 1 The issues were whether PNM "controlled" Western Coal and
whether the contract was subject to the jurisdiction of a regulatory body.
The court set the Commission's order aside on two grounds: first, the
Commission could not find "control" based solely on the fact that PNM
owned fifty percent of the stock of Western Coal; 62 and second, the contract
between PNM and Western Coal was subject to the "regulatory authority"
of the New Mexico Public Service Commission. The Tenth Circuit inter-
preted the "regulatory authority" requirement of section 35.14(a)(7) as ap-
plying to the contract, rather than to the sources of the fuel. Since a recent
amendment of state law clarified the New Mexico Public Service Commis-
sion's authority to determine whether a utility's fuel contract was reason-
56. The seven percent formula was first introduced as an interim standard by the ICC in
Annual Volume Rates on Coal-Wyoming to Flint Creek, Arkansas, 361 I.C.C. 533, 550 (1979).
57. 637 F.2d at 768-69.
58. The Tenth Circuit's disposition of this case placed it in accord with the Circuit Court
for the District of Columbia in San Antonio, Tex. v. United States, 631 F.2d 831 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
59. 628 F.2d 1267 (10th Cir. 1980).
60. 18 C.F.R. § 35.14(a)(7) (1980). The regulation reads in part:
Where the utility purchases fuel from a company-owned or controlled source, the price
of which is subject to the jurisdiction of a regulatory body, such cost shall be deemed
to be reasonable and includable in the adjustment clause . . . . With respect to the
price of fuel purchases from company-owned or controlled sources pursuant to con-
tracts which are not subject to regulatory authority, the utility company shall file such
contracts and amendments thereto with the Commission for its acceptance. . . . Any
subsequent amendment to such contracts shall likewise be filed with the Commission
as a rate schedule change and may be subject to suspension under section 205 of the
Federal Power Act.
Id.
61. 628 F.2d at 1268.
62. The court had previously held that control is a question of fact. SEC v. Int'l Chem.
Dev. Corp., 469 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1972). The record showed only that PNM owned 50% of the
coal company stock and Tucson Gas and Electric owned the other 50%. 628 F.2d at 1269.
19821
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able,63 the court found the requisite "regulatory authority" to exempt PNM
from the filing requirement. 6
The other two petitions involved the Commission's approval of certain
rates charged to the City of Gallup by PNM. The issue was whether the
Commission should have used a fixed-rate standard rather than a nonfixed-
rate standard in approving the rates. 65 The Commission had determined
that the PNM-Gallup contract was not a fixed-rate contract, and thereby
applied a "just and reasonable" standard in the hearings required by section
206 of the Federal Power Acts.66 The Tenth Circuit agreed that the Com-
mission had applied the correct standard.
The court based its holding upon specific contract provisions which
gave PNM the right to increase the rates and gave Gallup the option to
terminate the contract within 90 days. 67 The court had previously deter-
mined that the same contract did not permit unilateral rate increases by rate
filings, and that changes could only be made upon order of the Commission,
that is, the "regulatory body" contemplated in Article XII of the contract.
68
As a final issue, the court determined that the City of Gallup failed to
prove that the new higher rate schedule effected a "price squeeze" 69 on the
city as a purchaser for resale. The city failed to show either that it competed
with PNM at the retail level or that the rate schedules for Gallup were
higher than PNM retail rates.
70
The issue in Cities Services Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatoy Commiszon 7'
was whether the Commission had acted arbitrarily in affirming an adminis-
trative law judge's refusal to permit Cities Services Gas Company (Cities) to
earn a return on its unrecovered purchased gas costs 7 2 by including that
63. The amendment reads:
The sale, furnishing or delivery of coal, uranium or other fuels by any affiliated inter-
est to a utility for the generation of electricity for the public shall be subject to regula-
tion by the commission but only to the extent necessary to enable the commission to
determine that the cost to the utility . . . at the point of sale is reasonable ....
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-6-4(C)(1978 & Supp. 1980).
64. 628 F.2d at 1269.
65. The significance of applying a particular standard lies in the scrutiny subsequently
given the rate proposals by the Commission. The nonfixed-rate standard requires a finding that
the rates are "just and reasonable." 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a)(1976 & Supp. l1 1979). The standard
for fixed-rate contracts, set forth in F.P.C. v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956), is
whether the contract rates are so low "as to adversely affect the public interest."
66. 16 U.S.C. § 824e (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
67. 628 F.2d at 1270.
68. Public Service Co. v. FPC, 557 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1977). Accord, Louisiana Power &
Light v. FERO, 587 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1979); Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. FPC, 535 F.2d 1325
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
69. The Supreme Court, in FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271 (1976), held that the
"price squeeze" issue was a proper one in the Commission's consideration of new rate schedules.
70. 628 F.2d at 1270.
71. 627 F.2d 1027 (10th Cir. 1980).
72. Because the cost of purchased gas constitutes the largest single component of a pipeline
company's cost of service, the Commission allows the pipeline company to include purchased
gas cost adjustment provisions (PGA clauses) within their tariffs. The company is allowed to
increase its rates every six months, based on changes in the PGA. Cost increases the company
has experienced in the interim period are recorded in an unrecovered purchased gas account,
which, with carrying charges, are recovered through a surcharge filed with the next PGA ad-
justment. Id. at 1028-29.
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amount as working capital in its rate base.
Between January 23, 1974 and April 22, 1975, Cities, a natural gas
pipeline company, experienced a dramatic price increase in the cost of gas
purchased from its suppliers. The price increases were approved by the
Commission. The increases, in turn, raised Cities' unrecovered purchase gas
account balance to an annual average of $10,915,352, reflecting annual car-
rying costs of approximately $2,000,000. Cities had sought to include the
actual average balance of unrecovered purchased gas costs as working capi-
tal in its rate base, thereby earning a return on costs "prudently and neces-
sarily incurred in serving its customers." '73 The administrative law judge
ruled that decreases in working capital which would have resulted without
the inclusion of unrecovered costs in the working capital account were suffi-
cient its providing funds for the unrecovered purchased gas costs. 74 Though
the Commission affirmed, it did so on the grounds that carrying charges on
these costs were prohibited by regulations prior to 1979, and that Cities
failed to establish that the average costs were representative of true costs
actually incurred, and failed to justify its proposed return through its rates.
75
Cities appealed, alleging that it was unlawfully prohibited from earning a
return on its investment (unrecovered purchase gas costs), and that the Com-
mission's "reasons" for denying cost recovery were arbitrary and
capricious. 76
The scope of the court's inquiry in this case was narrow. It essentially
determined whether the Commission abused or exceeded its authority,
whether the Commission's order was supported by substantial evidence, and
whether the order's economic consequences were reasonable vis-a-vis the rel-
evant public interest. The test used was whether the Commission had
"given reasoned consideration to each of the pertinent factors."' 77
The court determined that the Commission had acted arbitrarily, based
upon the Commission's refusal to consider the adverse economic conse-
quences Cities would suffer.78 The costs Cities incurred stemmed directly
from the Commission's actions in approving producer price increases. In
addition, the court noted that the Commission had amended its PGA regula-
tions on June 1, 1979 to allow recovery of the carrying costs the Commission
had argued were prohibited by earlier regulations. 79 By pursuing this denial
of relief to Cities, the Commission was erroneously relying on traditional
ratemaking principles in derogation of "present day conditions" mandated
by the Supreme Court in United Railways v. West. 8°
McCombs v. Federal Energ Regulatog Commission8 ' involved review of a
73. Id. at 1029-30.
74. Id. at 1029.
75. Id. at 1029-30.
76. Id. at 1030.
77. Id. (citing Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 791-92 (1968)).
78. Cities' only burden was to establish that its proposed rate was "just and reasonable".
627 F.2d at 1030.
79. Id. at 1031.
80. 280 U.S. 234 (1930).
81. No. 75-1829 (10th Cir. Nov. 7, 1980), reheaning granted en banc, No. 75-1829 (Mar. 10,
1981). The court had set aside the Commission's order in its first opinion, McCombs v. FPC,
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Commission order requiring the petitioners to deliver natural gas produced
from certain leases in Texas to United Gas Pipe Line Company. McCombs'
predecessor, Quin, acquired an oil and gas lease and entered into a contract
with United Gas whereby United Gas could purchase gas produced from the
"Butler B" tract and any "unitized" 8 2 lands which included the Butler B
tract. The gas was to be resold in interstate commerce; therefore, Quin ap-
plied to the Commission for certificates of public convenience and necessity
needed to provide interstate service under the Natural Gas Act.8 3 The But-
ler B lease was assigned on various occasions. United Gas had stopped re-
ceiving natural gas under the contract in 1966 when production on the
Butler B tract ceased, even though the contract itself remained effective until
1981. McCombs acquired his interest in 1971 and unitized the Butler B
tract with a neighboring tract, "Butler A." He drilled deep produced wells
on both tracts and then contracted to sell the natural gas produced from the
tracts to duPont in intrastate commerce.8 4 The Commission found that this
sale violated the Natural Gas Act,8 5 and therefore ordered McCombs to de-
liver or "pay back" to United Gas volumes of gas produced from wells on
Butler A equal to those previously delivered to duPont.
8 6
The court held that the issue of whether the Commission had authority
to order interstate deliveries from the wells on the neighboring Butler A tract
was not ripe for review until the Commission determined whether Butler A
was dedicated to interstate commerce.8 7 The court also determined that the
Commission had no authority to order gas paybacks as a remedy for viola-
tions of the Natural Gas Act, The proper course of action under the Act was
for the Commission to have brought an action in district court.88 Allowing
the paybacks under section 16 of the Natural Gas Act,8 9 as was urged by the
Commission, would unduly expand the Commission's powers. Section 16
sets forth the general administrative powers of the Commission, but does not
give it the tribunal powers prerequisite to imposing remedies for past viola-
tions, nor does it enlarge the Commission's substantive authority specifically
granted in other sections of the Act. 9°
The Tenth Circuit's narrow view of section 16 authority in McCombs
542 F.2d 1144 (10th Cir. 1976). This decision was vacated, and the order was again set aside
after rehearing. McCombs v. FPC, 570 F.2d 1376 (10th Cir. 1978). The United States Supreme
Court unanimously reversed, United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. McCombs, 442 U.S. 529 (1979), and
the present case was remanded for consideration of the remaining matters.
82. Two or more tracts overlying a common field of oil or gas are "pooled" or "unitized" if
they are operated as a single producing unit. No. 75-1829, slip. op. at 3 n. 1.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1976).
84. McCombs v. FPC, 542 F.2d at 1145-46.
85. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
86. No. 75-1829, slip. op. at 4-5.
87. The court determined that while postponing this decision would require McCombs to
continue delivering gas from Butler A to United Gas, it would not constitute irreparable hard-
ship. If error in the Commission's order was found later, it could be remedied by reducing the
amount of gas McCombs must deliver from the Butler B tract in the future.
88. Section 20, 15 U.S.C. § 717s (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
89. Section 16, 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) "The Commission shall have
power. . . to. . . issue. . . such orders, rules and regulation as it may find necessaOy or appropri-
ate .... " (emphasis added).
90. No. 75-1829, slip op. at 15.
[Vol. 59:2
LANDS AND NA TURAL RESOURCES
places it in disagreement with other circuits. In Cox v. Federal Energy Regula-
tog Commission,9 1 the Fifth Circuit upheld the Commission's orders requiring
companies to pay back diverted gas to the interstate market. In GulfOil Corp.
v. FPC,9 2 the Third Circuit agreed with the Fifth Circuit's expansive view of
section 16, 03 and upheld the Commission's refund order. The Tenth Cir-
cuit's holding in McCombs is, however, in accord with the Circuit Court for
the District of Columbia's narrower reading of section 16 authority ex-
pressed in Mobil Oil Corporation v. FPC04 and New England Power Co v. FPC.9 '
The Tenth Circuit also found that the order should be set aside because the
Commission had failed to establish a rational explanation for the payback
order.
96
Judge Holloway dissented from the majority's narrow reading of the
Commission's lack of authority to order paybacks under section 16. 9 7 The
dissent found the Commission's remedy of ordering paybacks for unlawfully
diverted gas logical and within the broad authority granted by section 16.
Even so, the Commission's order requiring paybacks from the date of the
duPont-McCombs contract was unjustified. Almost a year had elapsed be-
tween the contract and the date United Gas asserted its claim for the di-
verted gas. The dissent argued that the equities of the circumstances did not
justify an order to restore gas prior to the date United Gas asserted its claim.
The dissent concluded that the payback order should be affirmed, but modi-
fied to reflect the tardy assertion of United's claim. 98
The Tenth Circuit also addressed duPont's status in these proceedings.
The Commission had decided not to address duPont's motion that it be dis-
missed as it was not subject to the Commission's jurisdiction.99 DuPont was
not under Commission orders at the time of this case; however, it feared the
Commission might issue orders against it in the future. The court deter-
mined that the Commission's denial of duPont's motion was "an order issued
by the Commission," thereby subject to court review under section 19(b) of
the Natural Gas Act. t°0 Because duPont was aggrieved by the order, it was
91. 581 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1978).
92. 563 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. dentied, 434 U.S. 1062, cert. dtimtssed, 435 U.S. 911, reh.
dened, 435 U.S. 981 (1978).
93. The Third Circuit relied upon the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of section 16 in Mesa
Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 441 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1971).
94. 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
95. 467 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1972), afd, 415 U.S. 345 (1974). Whether such a narrow
reading of section 16 authority is still followed by the D.C. Circuit is questionable. In a 1976
curtailment plan case, United States Steel Corp. v. FPC, 533 F.2d 1217(D.C. Cir. 1976), the
court stated, "We find payback not only permissible but mandatory in cases such as this to
protect the interest of other pipeline customers who must absorb the additional curtailment
which results." Id. at 1223. While the Tenth Circuit distinguished the remedy of a reduction in
allocations from a "payback," No. 75-1829, slip op. at 16 n.5, US. Steel apparently upholds an
assumption of tribunal power by the Commission in remedying a past violation.
96. The only explanation given by the Commission was that United Gas would be made
whole by the payback order. No. 75-1829, slip op. at 17-18 n.6.
97. No. 75-1829, slip op. at 6, (Holloway, J., dissenting).
98. Id., slip op. at 6-9.
99. No. 75-1829, slip op. at 20.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1976). "Any party to a proceeding aggrieved by an order issued
by the Commission in such proceeding may obtain a review of such order in the circuit court of
appeals of the United States .... "
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allowed petition for review under the Act. In determining the merits of du-
Pont's contention that it was not subject to Commission jurisdiction, the
Tenth Circuit found that duPont did not purchase, 10 ' transport or sell gas in
interstate commerce. Therefore, duPont was not a "natural gas company"
within the meaning of the Act,10 2 and the Commission had no basis for juris-




In Beaver v. Andrus,104 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted 43
C.F.R. § 2802.1-2, 105 which grants an applicant seeking a right-of-way per-
mit over federal land an exemption from reimbursing the United States for
administrative costs incurred in the processing of his application. The plain-
tiffs were twenty-nine cities and towns in Utah and California, which formed
Intermountain Power Project (IPP), a non-profit corporation. IPP's pur-
poses were to build and operate a coal-fueled steam electric generating plant
on federal lands in southern Utah and to provide power to cities and towns
in Utah and California. The plaintiffs claimed an exemption based upon
their status as "[s]tate or local governments or agencies or instrumentalities
thereof where the lands shall be used for governmental purposes and such
lands and resources shall continue to serve the general public. . . ."I The
issue was whether the land and resources would continue to "serve the gen-
eral public."
The Secretary of the Interior argued that publicly owned utilities or
power sources do not "serve the general public" because the land involved is
not fully and completely open to the public. 10 7 The plaintiffs contended
that generation and transmission of power by a non-profit corporation for
the people within its geographical service area is a public purpose and serv-
ices the general public as a class. The benefit to the general public rather
than the public's access to the land should be controlling in determining
whether the exemption is applicable. The narrow issue presented was
whether the exemption applies only if the proposed use serves all of the pub-
lic within a particular geographic area.108
Turning to legislative history and the language of three acts' 0 9 dealing
with reimbursement by beneficiaries of government services, the court found
101. The Tenth Circuit distinguished California v. Southland Royalty Co., 436 U.S. 519
(1978), on the basis that duPont purchased the gas for its own use, not for resale.
102. Natural Gas Act § l(b), 15 U.S.C. § 717a(6) (1976).
103. No. 75-1829, slip op. at 24.
104. 637 F.2d 749 (10th Cir. 1980).
105. 43 C.F.R. § 2802.1-2 (1979) (superseded by 43 C.F.R. § 2803.1-1 (1980)).
106. 43 C.F.R. § 2802.1-2(a)(2)(i) (1979).
107. 637 F.2d at 752.
108. Id. at 753-54.
109. The plaintiffs argued that they were exempt from cost reimbursement due to provi-
sions within the Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1953 (IOAA), 31 U.S.C. 483a (1976),
and the Public Land Administration Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1371, 74 Stat. 506 (repealed 1976). The
Secretary contended that the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43
U.S.C. § 1701 (1976), was the authorizing statute. 637 F.2d at 752-53.
[Vol. 59:2
LANDS AND NA TURAL RESOURCES
a common thread. Services the federal government provides to special inter-
est groups at the taxpayers' expense were distinguished from services the gov-
ernment provides for the benefit of the public at large. The court concluded
that the thrust of the regulations is to make the beneficiaries, whose special
interests are served by government services, pay for the costs of those serv-
ices. The plaintiffs in this case simply did not fall into that self-interest
classification. "10
The Tenth Circuit clarified its holding in Alumet v. Andn es" which im-
plied that the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA)
alone was the standard for interpreting the regulation in question. Al/umet
addressed only the issue of whether the reimbursement could include the
cost of an environmental impact statement. The issue of whether the regula-
tions were valid under other acts did not arise, thus the Alumet holding was
in accord with this case.
11 2
The appellants in Topaz Beryllhum Co. v. United States" t3 challenged regu-
lations promulgated under FLPMA 4 because they set forth requirements
for the filing of unpatented claims which exceed the requirements under the
Act itself.' -15 The appellants contended that the regulations are "in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right,"
and therefore unlawful. 1
6
The court recognized that the filing and recordation provisions of the
regulations were more demanding than section 1744 of the Act. 11 7 However,
three of the filing requirements, 43 C.F.R. § 3833.1-2(a),(b) and § 3833.2-1,
were no more stringent than those under section 1744 of the Act. Further-
more, the effect of not complying with the additional requirements of other
subparts of Section 3833 would only make the filings defective; such failure
would not render a claim abandoned and void." 8 Any defects in filing
could be cured later."19
The court reasoned that the purpose of the supplemental filings, to give
notice of the claim and to provide data to be used in land use planning,1
20
was fulfilled by the broad grant of authority to the Secretary of the Interior
under FLPMA. The gathering of the information required by section 3833
assisted in the efficient administration of section 1744 and coordinated its
operation with the rest of the Act.
12 1
110. 637 F.2d at 753-57.
111. 607 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1979).
112. 637 F.2d at 756.
113. 649 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1981).
114. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
115. The specific recordation requirements under FLPMA are found at 43 U.S.C. § 6, 1744
(1976). The regulations contain additional filing requirements and supplement filings. 43
C.F.R. § 3833 (1980).
116. 649 F.2d at 776.
117. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3833.0-5(e),.1-2(c)(2), .2-2(a)(2), -2(b)(2), -3(a)(l)(ii), -3(b)(2), .0-5(i),. 1-
2(c)(5), -2(c)(6), .2-3 (1980) supplement 43 U.S.C. § 1744 (1976). 649 F.2d at 778 n.2.
118. Only failure to comply with 43 C.F.R. §§ 3833.1-2(a),-2(b), .2-1(1980) renders a claim
abandoned and void. 649 F.2d at 778.





The appellants further contended that the notice requirement of 43
C.F.R. § 3833.5(d) was invalid.' 22 This section provides that notice of ac-
tions or contests affecting unpatented mining claims need be given only to
those owners who have recorded their claims or sites pursuant to section
3833.1-2, or have filed a notice of transfer of interest pursuant to section
3833.3. Appellants alleged that this provision would allow parties other
than the Government to initiate contests and win default judgments. In ad-
dition, even if such actions were brought by the Government, the section
could result in the loss of valuable mining claims; a result not authorized
under FLPMA. 1
23
The court held that section 3833.5(d) was unavailable to third parties; it
applies only to Government-initiated contests. Third parties cannot rely
simply upon claims recorded with the government, but must also search lo-
cal records when determining to whom notices should be sent.' 24 Further-
more, the regulation does not, in itself, operate as an automatic forfeiture;
section 1744 of the Act is the operative forfeiture provision.' 25 The notice
provision found in 43 C.F.R. § 3833.5(d) merely provides a facilitated proce-
dure by which the Secretary can efficiently satisfy his due process obligation
to give notice to affected parties when a contest is initiated. ' 26 Moreover, a
transferee who failed to file a notice of transfer will be unprotected only until
he files his first annual filing, required by 43 U.S.C. § 1744, as the govern-
ment is required to search all records filed with it pursuant to the regula-
tions.' 27 This minimizes any risks involved and provides adequate due
process protection to affected parties, yet comports with the practical necessi-
ties of managing public lands.'
28
Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v. Andrus 129 involved an appeal from the trial
court's denial of Rocky Mountain Energy Company's (RME) motion to in-
tervene in Rosebud Coal's challenge of the Department of the Interior's stat-
utory right to increase the royalty rate on certain federally leased coal taken
pursuant to Rosebud's federal coal lease. 130 Although not a party to the
lease, RME contended that it was entitled to intervene by virtue of its in-
dependent coal leasing contract with Rosebud covering non-federal coal de-
122. Id.
123. Id. at 778-79.
124. Id. at 779.
125. 43 U.S.C. § 1744(c) (1976) provides, in pertinent part: "The failure to file such instru-
ments as are required by subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall be deemed conclusively to
constitute an abandonment of the mining claim . . . by the owner."
126. The Tenth Circuit quoted the following language of the district court: "It is easier and
more efficient to require millions of claim holders to say to the government early on, 'tell me' if
you intend to challenge my interest, than to require the government to ferret out millions of
interested persons from local records scattered in thousands of locations." 649 F.2d at 779.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 644 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1981).
130. The district court opinion is reported as Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v. Andrus, No. C79-
160B (D. Wyo., June 10, 1980). The district court held that the attempted adjustment was
arbitrary, capricious, and beyond the Department of the Interior's statutory authority. The
Department has appealed this decision. St Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v. Andrus, No. 80-1842
(10th Cir., filed Aug. 11, 1980).
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posits.' 3 1 Because the royalty rate under this contract was determined by
reference to the royalty rate Rosebud Coal paid under the federal coal
lease,' 32 RME claimed that the contract constituted "an interest relating to
the property or transaction which is the subject of the action," a basis for
intervention under rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, RME did not seek to intervene until the district court held that
the Department exceeded its statutory authority in attempting to increase
the royalty rate.' 33 The district court denied RME's motion to intervene on
the ground that it was untimely. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the denial,
but based its decision on public policy grounds.
The Tenth Circuit held that the vague language of rule 24(a)(2)134 ne-
cessitated applying the policies underlying the rule's "interest" requirement
to the facts of the case.' 35 The policies under rule 24 are often conflicting:
avoiding a multiplicity of lawsuits and protecting interested parties, yet
maintaining efficiency and due process protections of litigants.1 36 The "in-
terest" requirement directs the intervenor to show he has a "direct, substan-
tial, legally protectable interest in the proceedings,"' 3 7 that is, "standing"
under Rule 17(a).
138
The court found that RME's claim was based solely on the fact that
RME voluntarily tied its contract lease rate to the Department-Rosebud
rate schedule. No privity of contract existed between RME and the Depart-
ment. The court concluded that the Rosebud-RME contract's relation to
the federal rate schedule did not establish the requisite "interest" for a right
of intervention. RME was in the same position as total strangers who incor-
porate the Department-Rosebud rate schedule into their own coal leasing
contracts. 139 The court as a practical matter found that allowing such a
universal rate of intervention would open the floodgates to intervenors in
every adjustment of a federal standard. 14
131. 644 F.2d at 850.
132. RME leased coal land to Rosebud in return for royalty payments on the coal removed
from the property. If the Department of the Interior could increase Rosebud's royalty rate,
RME could profit from the increase in its own royalty payments. Id.
133. RME had filed an amicus brief at the trial. Id.
134. Rule 24(a) reads, in pertinent part:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action: . . .(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by ex-
isting parties.
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a). The fact dependence of rule 24(a)(2)'s interest requirement has prece-
dence in the Tenth Circuit. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States, 578 F.2d
1341 (10th Cir. 1978).
135. The lease agreement provided that the Department of the Interior could raise the roy-
alty rates every twenty years. The issue was whether the increase must occur on the twentieth
anniversary or whether it can occur anytime after twenty years.
136. 644 F.2d at 850 n.3.
137. Id. (quoting Piambino v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306, 1321 (5th Cir. 1980)).
138. 644 F.2d at 850 n.3.
139. "It would be absurd to allow the unilateral conduct of private parties to divest the
Government of control over its own litigation." Id. at 851 n.4.




In Lazy D Grazing Associ'aton v. Terry Land & Livestock Co. ,j4M the Tenth
Circuit interpreted a mineral reservation found in six deeds conveying land
to grazing associations, to be used for grazing purposes. The deeds reserved
all gas, casinghead gas, oil, and other minerals valuable as sources of petro-
leum. The issue on appeal focused on whether coal was included in this
reservation. ' 42 The Tenth Circuit found the reservation clause ambiguous
and stated that rules of construction of ambiguous contracts should be used
to determine its terms.' 43 Lazy D asserted that the reservation could not
have included coal because its extraction could be accomplished only by
strip mining, which would destroy the value of the surface for the grazing
and agricultural uses for which the land was purchased. Intent to destroy
surface use was not contemplated; therefore the reservation should not be
construed to include coal. The Tenth Circuit noted that some courts have
held, as a matter of law, that a broad reservation of mineral interests does
not include a mineral which is not specified in the reservation when the only
means of extraction would destroy the surface. ' 44 Noting also that other
jurisdictions have rejected this argument,145 the court chose not to address
the issue since Lazy D failed to present evidence that strip mining was the
only available method of extraction. 146 There was no factual support for
appellants' allegation that the intent to preserve surface uses would be vio-
lated by interpreting the reservation as including coal.
Lazy D further contended that the parties intended the terms "other
minerals valuable as a source of petroleum" to include only minerals pres-
ently valuable as petroleum sources, rather than minerals with prospective
value. Expert witnesses for both parties testified that coal was not a valuable
source of petroleum in the United States in 1965 (the date of the deed) nor at
the present time. They did state, however, that given the current oil
shortage, coal will become a valuable petroleum source in the future. The
trial court had concluded that the parties intended to reserve minerals with
prospective value as a source of petroleum. 1
4 7
(10th Cir. 1978) (Stare decisis effect of enjoining the issuance of license creates an "interest" in
the litigation; potential licensees allowed to intervene).
141. 641 F.2d 844 (10th Cir. 1981).
142. Lazy D asked the trial court to declare the respective owners of all minerals underlying
the land. However, on appeal it only sought a determination of ownership of the coal reserves.
Id. at 846 n.2.
143. Id. at 847.
144. E.g. Cumberland Mineral Co. v. United States, 513 F.2d 1399 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Carson v.
Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 212 Ark. 963, 209 S.W.2d 97 (1948); Farrell v. Sayre, 129 Colo. 368, 270
P.2d 190 (1954); Wulf v. Schultz, 211 Kan. 724, 508 P.2d 896 (1973); Acker v. Guinn, 464
S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
Other courts view the destruction of the surface estate as a means of determining the par-
ties' intent. Strip mining is only one factor in finding an intent to include a particular mineral
in a reservation. See, e.g., Southern Title Co. v. Oiler, 286 Ark. 300, 595 S.W.2d 681 (1980).
145. 641 F.2d at 846. A Ninth Circuit decision appears to have rejected the "destruction of
the surface" argument without discussion. Chugach Natives v. Doyton, 588 F.2d 723 (9th Cir:
1978).
146. In fact, evidence was presented that underground mining might be feasible, and that
there were outcroppings of coal on the land. 641 F.2d at 847.
147. Id.
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The Tenth Circuit was reluctant to impose the "present marketabil-
ity"1 48 rule of "valuable" under the Federal Mineral Land Statute' 49 to a
reservation in a private deed. No evidence was presented to show that the
parties in this case were influenced by the definition of rights under federal
mining law when they drafted the reservation. The record did not reveal
any particular intent as to the meaning given by the parties. The court
thought it was significant that two witnesses, representing other grazing as-
sociations that purchased land in the same transaction and under deeds
identical to Lazy D's, testified that the parties intended the reservation of all
minerals except sand and gravel.150 Finding no clear error by the trial court,
the Tenth Circuit affirmed that the reservation included minerals with pro-
spective value as a source of petroleum.
Addressing the issue in Terry Land's cross-appeal, whether "source of
petroleum" could include minerals which serve as depositories for petroleum
in the ground as well as minerals which could be converted into petroleum,
the Tenth Circuit considered the context in which this term was used.' 5 1
Looking to the language of the entire reservation, the court applied the doc-
trine ofyqusdem genenr' and concluded that the enumeration of petroleum-like
minerals indicated that the parties were interested in reserving only minerals
similar in character to petroleum. Therefore, the phrase "and other minerals
valuable as a source of petroleum" reserved only those minerals that could
be converted to petroleum, and not those which serve as depositories.'
52
VII. INDIAN LANDS
In Logan v. Andrus,'153 seven members of the Osage tribe who owned
shares in the Osage mineral estate appealed an interpretation of the perime-
ters of tribal council powers pursuant to the Osage Allotment Act,1 54 partic-
ularly the extent of those powers when administering the tribe's mineral
estate. The appellants contended that the council's authority was limited to
administering the mineral estate and did not extend to participating in or
representing the Osage tribe in various federal programs.
The Tenth Circuit held that the provisions of the 1906 version of the
Act, as well as the 1929 reenactment, 155 vested the tribal council with the
power to administer the mineral estate as well as the general powers of tribal
government. Even though the 1906 Act was enacted primarily to establish
148. Two rules determine whether a mineral deposit is valuable. The "prudent man" rule
requires a claimant to show that "a person of ordinary prudence would be justified in the fur-
ther expenditure of his labor and means, with a reasonable prospect of success in developing a
valuable mine." Castle v. Womble, 19 L.D. 455 (1894). The "present marketability" rule re-
quires that at the time of discovery, the mineral could be marketed at a profit." United States
v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 602 (1968). The present marketability rule complements the prudent
man rule at times. 641 F.2d at 848.
149. 30 U.S.C. § 21 (1976).
150. 641 F.2d at 849.
151. Id. at 848-49.
152, Id. at 849-50.
153. 640 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1981).
154. Ch. 3572, 34 Stat. 539 (1906) (amended 1929 and 1978).
155. Act of March 2, 1929, ch. 493, 45 Stat. 1478.
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individual mineral allotments, the rules for election of the Osage tribal of-
ficers described the offices in terms of typical tribal government positions,
such as "Principal Chief" and "Osage Tribal Council."' 156 The statute did
not limit the positions to any specific function; in fact, the tribal government
exercised general authority. The 1929 reenactment described the officers
and council as the "tribal government,"' 157 further resolving the question of
the council's general authority. The general authority, the court concluded,
encompassed the right to include the tribe as a participant in various federal
programs. 158
The Tenth Circuit also affirmed the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's
motion to vacate the judgment based on the unconstitutionality of the 1906
Act. The plaintiffs contended that the Act limited the right to vote for coun-
cil candidates to only those who owned shares in the mineral estate. The
trial court had denied the motion because the plaintiffs had failed to address
the issue in their pleadings and because the plaintiffs, as owners of shares,
had no standing to assert the rights of those not owning shares. 159
The Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court's determination that the 1881
Osage Constitution was valid. The Tenth Circuit found that no tribal coun-
cil rights or authority were derived from the 1881 Constitution; therefore it
was not in a position to address the possible implications of such a ruling.
The issue of the constitution's validity was not adjudicated in this case.16°
In Misouri-Kansas- Texas Railroad Co. v. Earl, 161 the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals was asked to decide the nature of the railroad's property interest
in its roadbed running over Indian lands. The trial court had held that the
railroad had a vested fee simple absolute title in the land.
The Tenth Circuit began its resolution of the case with an examination
of the history of how the railroad initially acquired the land upon which the
roadbed was built. In 1833, the United States granted the Creek Nation
certain lands in fee; letters of patent were issued in 1852.162 In 1866, Con-
gress had ratified a treaty between the Creek Nation and the United
States 163 which granted a right-of-way for railroads through the Indian
lands.' 64 In addition, the Creek Nation agreed to sell to the United States
certain strips of lands lying along the railroad. 165 The court then examined
two acts of Congress which vested title to these strips of land. The Act of
July 25, 1866,166 provided an incentive for each of the three railroads build-
ing lines in Kansas to quickly finish their work. The first railroad to com-
plete its work was given the right to build a track from southern Kansas
through Indian territory and to link up with a line near Preston, Texas. The
156. Ch. 3572, § 9, 34 Stat. 539 (1906) (amended 1929 and 1978).
157. 640 F.2d at 270.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 271.
160. Id.
161. 641 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1981).
162. Id. at 857.
163. 14 Stat. 785 (1866).
164. Id. at 787.
165. Id.
166. Ch. 241, 14 Stat. 236 (1866).
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winner, Missouri-Kansas-Texas (MKT) Railroad's predecessor, was granted
a right-of-way of 100 feet on each side of the roadbed. The Act of July 26,
1866167 provided for a similar grant to MKT's predecessor to expedite con-
struction of a railroad line from Kansas to Fort Smith, Arkansas. Both acts
covered the strip of land at issue.
The appellants argued that the Creek Nation acquired the lands in
question by patent in 1852. The subsequent grant of the right-of-way was in
the nature of an easement which was never purchased. The appellants
urged that the easement had been abandoned, thereby extinguishing the
railroad's interest in the property and vesting it in the owners of the adjacent
land. The Tenth Circuit disagreed.
The court noted that prior to 1875, it was common for Congress to
grant to the railroads fee interests, using the term "right-of-way."'' 6 Fur-
thermore, the Supreme Court had construed the Act of July 26, 1866, as
granting the railroad a fee interest.1 69 While the court acknowledged that
some ambiguity may have existed in the language of the Act of July 25,
1866, it was clarified by the Act of July 26, 1866 which clearly granted to the
railway a fee interest.' 70 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial
court in holding that the railroad had acquired a fee simple interest in the
property.
In Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico,' 7 1 the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of whether state or tribal law prevailed in regu-
lating wildlife within the Mescalero Apache reservation. The tribe had
adopted various hunting and fishing ordinances as part of an extensive tour-
ism and revenue raising program. Some of the tribal ordinances were clearly
inconsistent with New Mexico's hunting and fishing laws.' 72 The tribe
sought and obtained a declaratory judgment that held state hunting and
fishing laws inapplicable within the boundaries of the reservation. 173 The
state had conceded that it had no jurisdiction over tribal members on the
reservation. However, the state appealed the district court's holding as ap-
plied to non-members of the tribe.
The court initially addressed several procedural questions. The state
questioned the tribe's right to bring an action, alleging that the tribe had no
standing to sue 174 and that the suit was not justiciable. The court found
that standing existed based on the imminent, adverse economic effects of
167. Ch. 270, 14 Stat. 289 (1866).
168. Id. at 859.
169. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Oklahoma, 271 U.S. 303 (1926); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v.
Roberts, 152 U.S. 114 (1894).
170. 641 F.2d at 860.
171. 630 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1980), vacated, 101 S. Ct. 1752 (1981).
172. The tribe did not require hunters on the reservation to purchase a state license, and
contrary to state law, the tribe permitted elk and antelope hunters to purchase permits in con-
secutive years. Tribal hunting seasons and bag limits also differed from those of the state. 630
F.2d at 726.
173. Id.
174. The state claimed that the tribe was seeking to enjoin enforcement of statutes which
did not apply to its members. In the state's view, the challenge could only be prosecuted by
aggrieved non-member sportsmen. Id. at 727 n.6.
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compliance with state law upon the tribe, 175 as well as on an injured sover-
eign basis.' 76 Since the state has indicated that it would prosecute non-tri-
bal violators of the state game laws and the impact of such prosecution upon
the tribe was "sufficiently direct and immediate,"' 1 77 the court determined
that the issue was ripe for review. The court also affirmed the district court's
holding that the United States need not be joined as a necessary party.'17
The merits of the case, however, involved the question of federal pre-
emption. The court began its discussion with the recognition of the premise
that states cannot exercise regulatory powers within the confines of a feder-
ally recognized, "semi-independent" Indian reservation if the subject matter
has been preempted by federal law or if the state regulation infringes on the
tribe's right of self-government.' 79 The court then applied a two-part analy-
sis to determine whether federal preemption existed. First, under the tradi-
tional liberal standard of construction of Indian treaties and statutes,' 8 0 the
court found six sources of preemption in this case: 181 1) the Treaty;'8 2 2) the
Enabling Act of New Mexico;' 8 3 3) the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934;
(IRA);' a4 4) the Tribal Constitution '8 5 and ordinances enacted pursuant to
the IRA; 5) extensive federal developmental assistance; and 6) the negative
inferences from Public Law 280.186
The court found explicit expression of federal dominance on the reser-
vation in the language of the Mescalero Apache Reservation Treaty l' 7 and
the Enabling Act of New Mexico,'8 with an express grant of tribal control
175. The tribe's wildlife management ordinances were part of a larger tourism program
"designed to bring income and employment to the Reservation." Id. at 726. The effect of
requiring the individual sportsmen to meet state and tribal regulations, could limit the tribe's
ability to raise the costs of its licenses and deter sportsmen from entering the reservation. Id. at
727.
176. Other circuits have found standing whenever Indian tribes have brought actions to
prevent states from unlawfully interfering with tribal regulation of hunting and fishing. See,
e.g., Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 591 F.2d 89 (9th
Cir. 1979); Eastern Bank of Cherokee Indians v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n,
588 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. dimissed, 446 U.S. 960 (1980).
177. 630 F.2d at 728.
178. Id.
179. Id.; White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980).
180. 630 F.2d at 728; The liberal standard dates back to the Marshall Court's decision in
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) and has been consistently followed since then.
Se, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280
U.S. 363 (1930).
181. 630 F.2d at 731.
182. Treaty with the Apaches, 10 Stat. 979 (1852).
183. Ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557 (1910) (amended 1942).
184. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976).
185. MESCALERO APACHE TRIBE REVISED CONST. art. 11, § 1(c).
186. Ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28 U.S.C.).
187. In article I of the treaty the tribe submits itself "exclusively [to] the laws, jurisdiction,
and government of the United States of America." 10 Stat. 979. The treaty, in article 9, also
provides that the United States shall "designate, settle, and adjust [the tribe's] territorial bound-
aries, and pass and execute. . . such laws as may be deemed conducive to the prosperity and
happiness of [the Mescalero Apaches]." 10 Stat. 979, 980.
188. Under the Act New Mexico Indian lands were placed "under the absolute jurisdiction
and control of the Congress of the United States." Ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557, 559 (1910) (amended
1942). Relying upon McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), the
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over hunting and fishing. The Tribal Constitution also specifically gives the
tribe power over wildlife on the reservation.' 8 9 Even prior to enacting its
constitution, the tribe had enacted ordinances to implement its traditionally
held and congressionally approved powers, which the court stated may serve
to preempt the state. 19° The court, relying on a Fourth Circuit decision,
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Commis-
sion,191 found a significant indication of federal preemption in the federal
government's extensive participation in the tribe's development of its
reservation fishing program, which was accomplished without state assist-
ance. t92 Finally, the state failed to exercise its option under Public Law
280193 of unilaterally asserting civil and criminal jurisdiction over the tribe.
Even if the state had assumed jurisdiction, that law in its present form specif-
ically protects the tribe from deprivation of its rights "with respect to hunt-
ing, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or regulating thereof."'
94
The court concluded that the treaty and statutory scheme, rather than over-
coming the presumption of federal preemption, "reasserts the exclusivity of
federal and tribal regulation of hunting and fishing."' 195 The state, there-
fore, had no power to apply game laws to persons hunting and fishing on the
reservation.
In the second part of the test, 196 determining the propriety of state regu-
lation of Indian reservations, the court analyzed the impact of the state regu-
lation upon tribal self-government. The Tenth Circuit used the test of
interference set forth by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Lee: 19 7 "absent
governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state
action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and be ruled by them."' 9 8 In applying that test, the Tenth Circuit found
that under Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 99 a court
must "[seek] an accommodation between the interests of the Tribes and the
Federal Government on the one hand, and those of the State, on the
other. ' ' 200 The court identified one overriding federal interest: "the obliga-
tion of the United States to respond to the strong expression of the Indian
people for self-determination."'2 0 1 In pure-taxation schemes, the state's in-
terest in raising revenue from on-reservation activity was outweighed by the
tribe's interest, because the tribe's revenues were derived from value gener-
Tenth Circuit concluded that in the area of resource management, the treaty language suggests
that "absolute" jurisdiction was synonymous with "exclusive" jurisdiction. 630 F.2d at 731.
189. MESCALERO APACHE REVISED CONST. art II, § I(c).
190. 630 F.2d at 731.
191. 588 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. dimrissed, 446 U.S. 960 (1980).
192. "Where the state plays no role in stocking reservation waters, it 'has no perceivable
interest in reservation fishing,'" 630 F.2d at 732 (quoting Easten Band, 588 F.2d at 78).
193. Ch. 505, § 2, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1976)).
194. 25 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1976).
195. 630 F.2d at 732.
196. The court noted that the analyses of the two tests overlap and that they may eventually
become one test. d. at 733, n. 18.
197. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
198. Id. at 220.
199. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
200. 630 F.2d at 733 (citing 447 U.S. at 156).
201. 630 F.2d at 733 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 450a(a) (1976)).
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ated on the reservation by activities involving the tribe, with the taxpayer
receiving tribal rather than state services. 20 2 Colville was distinguishable be-
cause of the clear state interference with a traditional tribal regulatory
power in the present case. Here, the tribe had a significant interest in wild-
life management, and the effect of state regulation was not limited to depri-
vation of tribal revenues. The principle underlying the Co/oil/e test was the
desire to promote Indian opportunities for developing their own
institutions.
203
The court also made an analogy to United States v. Sanford,20 4 where the
Ninth Circuit held Montana's elk hunting laws applicable to non-Indians
hunting on the reservation because the laws did not interfere with tribal self-
government. 20 5 In this case, however, the tribe did show that the state's laws
interfered with tribal self-governance.
20 6
The state raised environmental concerns, asserting itself as primary pro-
tector of the environment. The Tenth Circuit held that preservation of wild-
life was the duty of all sovereigns. 20 7 The court concluded that simultaneous
regulation was not in order here as it had been in the Montana case because
of the tribe's record in wildlife management.
20 8
The final issue concerned what the state called a "vacuum in the area of
enforcement" which would be created if neither the state nor the tribe could
exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-tribal members. The Tenth Circuit
pointed out that while the tribe may not have criminal enforcement powers,
it retained civil authority over non-tribal members. The United States
would have criminal jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1165. Section 1165
reads, in part: "Whoever, without lawful authority or permission, willfully
and knowingly goes upon any land that belongs to any Indian or Indian
Tribe. . . for the purpose of hunting, trapping, or fishing thereon, or for the
removal of games, peltries, or fish therefrom, shall be fined not more than
$200 or imprisoned not more than ninety (90) days, or both . . . ." The
United States' jurisdiction is based on conditional entry on tribal land, the
condition being that the entrant obey tribal game laws while on the reserva-
tion. A knowing violation of these laws renders the entry impermissive and,
therefore, a trespass subject to section 1165.209
As a final point, the court declared that the state could not regulate
possession of game off the reservation. The state must treat game legally
obtained from the reservation as it would game legally obtained from any
other source outside the state's jurisdiction. Furthermore, once the game has
been lawfully reduced to possession, the state's interest in protection of wild-
202. 630 F.2d at 733. The Supreme Court articulated this balancing process in Colville, 447
U.S. at 163-64.
203. 630 F.2d at 734.
204. 547 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1976).
205. Id. at 1089.
206. 630 F.2d at 733.
207. Id. at 734.
208. The state agreed that tribal management of reservation wildlife had been exemplary
and in conformance with accepted wildlife management procedures. Id. at 726.
209. Id. at 736.
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life ends.2 10
On April 6, 1981, the United States Supreme Court granted a petition
for writ of certiorari in the Mescalero case. 21 1 The judgment by the Tenth
Circuit was vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Montana v. United States.
2 12
The Montana case reversed and remanded a Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decision 2 13 dealing with the power of the Crow Tribe to prohibit or
regulate hunting and fishing within reservation boundaries. The Supreme
Court's holding in Montana was a narrow one, focusing on the distinction
between tribal-owned lands and lands owned in fee by non-members of the
tribe. 2 14 The Tenth Circuit failed to make such a distinction in Mescalero
and, therefore, may on remand have to amend its holding in the case.
The Ninth Circuit had held in Montana that the tribe could prohibit
non-members from hunting and fishing on lands belonging to the tribe or
held by the United States in trust for the tribe. 21 5 The Ninth Circuit had
further held that if the tribe did permit non-members to hunt or fish on such
lands, it could condition their entry on payment of a fee and could establish
bag and creel limits. 2 16 The Supreme Court concurred with the Ninth Cir-
cuit on both of these issues. 2 17 However, the Supreme Court held that these
tribal regulatory powers did not extend to non-members hunting and fishing
on reservation land owned in fee by non-members of the tribe.218
According to Montana, the Tenth Circuit's finding in Mescalero that the
tribe, not the state, has the power to regulate hunting and fishing on the
reservation would be affirmed. However, under Montana, that power is lim-
ited to those lands held by the tribe or in trust by the United States for the
tribe. 2 19 Those lands within the reservation held in fee by non-members
would be subject to state, rather than tribal regulation.220 In this respect,
the Tenth Circuit will have to determine if any such fee lands are regulated
by the Mescaleros. Since it is not the reservation boundaries which deter-
mine tribal jurisdiction for purposes of regulating hunting and fishing, but
rather tribal ownership of the land, the Mescaleros' laws may not apply to
the entire reservation.
Another aspect of the Mescalero case which might be given reconsidera-
tion in light of Montana is the Tenth Circuit's assertion that for purposes of
210. Id. at 736-37,
211. 450 U.S. 1036 (1981).
212. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
213. United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1979).
214. 450 U.S. at 557.
215. 604 F.2d at 1165-66.
216. Id.
217. 450 U.S. at 557.
218. Id. The General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, and the Crow Allotment
Act of 1920, ch. 224, 41 Stat. 451, authorized the issuance of patents in fee to individual Indian
allottees within the reservation. Under these Acts, an allottee could alienate his land to a non-
Indian after holding it for 25 years. Today approximately 28% of the Crow reservation is held
in fee by non-Indians. 450 U.S. at 548.




enforcement of the laws, the tribe has civil jurisdiction over non-members. 22 1
The Supreme Court again distinguished non-member lands from Indian
lands within the reservation. While the tribe does retain some inherent
power to exercise civil authority over non-members on fee lands within the
reservation, that power is limited to conduct which "threatens, or has some
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe."'222 The Supreme Court specifically held that non-
member fishing and hunting posed no such threat.223 It may be assumed
that the activities of the non-member hunters and fishermen in the Mescalero
case were similarly nonthreatening. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit may find
the tribe's civil jurisdiction to be, likewise, limited.
Ma ,E Walta
221. 630 F.2d at 735.
222. 450 U.S. at 566.
223. Id.
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